









The	 expansion	 of	 industrial	 mining	 in	 the	 eastern	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo	 has	 sparked	
social	mobilization	in	gold	mining	concessions,	most	of	which	are	important	sites	for	artisanal	mining.	
Congruent	with	observations	on	the	nature	of	social	movements	in	Africa,	such	mobilization	is	hyper-
fragmented	 and	 fluid.	 We	 ascribe	 this	 high	 degree	 of	 fluidity	 and	 fragmentation	 both	 to	 factors	
internal	 to	 the	 social	 mobilization	 effort,	 including	 limited	 organizational	 potential	 and	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 attitudes	 and	 discourses,	 and	 the	 political	 and	 socio-economic	 context,	
characterized	by	intense	conflicts,	patronage-based	politics,	poverty	and	repression.	Additionally,	we	
identify	 certain	 company	 practices	 as	 undermining	 the	 sustainability	 and	 coherence	 of	 social	
mobilization,	 in	 particular:	 the	 co-optation	 of	 intermediaries	 and	 protestors,	 acquiescence	 in	
practices	 of	 favoritism,	 fostering	 a	 repressive	 climate,	 and	 token	 commitment	 to	 community	
participation.	 We	 conclude	 that	 to	 understand	 social	 mobilization	 in	 mining	 concessions,	 it	 is	
important	to	study	the	interplay	between	political	(re)actions	‘from	above’	and	‘from	below’,	and	to	







In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 peace	 accord	 that	 formally	 ended	 the	 Second	 Congo	 War	 (1998–2003),	
transnational	mining	companies	have	(re)started	industrial	exploration	and	production	in	the	eastern	
Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo,	 despite	 ongoing	 volatility.	 This	 intensifying	 corporate	 interest	
(especially	in	gold)	heralds	a	new	chapter	in	the	Congo’s	long	and	intricate	history	of	mining,	marked	
by	episodes	of	industrialization	and	de-industrialization,	nationalization	and	privatization,	militarized	
mining	and	artisanal	 frontier	mining	 (Bryceson	and	Geenen,	2016).	One	of	 the	defining	 features	of	
the	 most	 recent	 episode	 of	 nascent	 industrialization	 is	 tension	 between	 artisanal	 miners	 and	
transnational	companies	as	well	as	between	companies	and	communities	more	generally.	This	article	
provides	 insight	 into	 such	 tensions	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 social	 mobilization	 around	 (and	 not	
necessarily	against)	industrial	mining.		
In	 line	with	 observations	 on	 the	nature	of	 social	mobilization	 in	Africa	 (de	Waal	 and	 Ibreck,	 2013;	
Larmer,	2010),	we	observe	that	mobilization	around	industrial	mining	in	the	Congo	is	both	very	fluid	-	
rapidly	 intensifying	and	waning	over	 time	–and	extremely	 fragmented–having	 limited	coordination,	
while	 the	 involved	 groups	 pursue	 different	 goals	 and	 adopt	 diverse	 strategies	 and	 discourses.	We	
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real	 commitment	 to	 community	 participation.	We	 contend	 that	 these	 actions	 and	 reactions	 ‘from	
above’	 often	 remain	 under-analyzed	 in	 scholarship	 on	 social	 mobilization	 around	 extractivist	
projects,	 which	 tends	 to	 focus	 on	 ‘political	 reactions	 from	 below’	 (Borras	 and	 Franco,	 2013).	
However,	to	understand	how	mobilization	unfolds,	it	is	needed	to	adopt	an	interactionist	approach,	
which	 looks	 at	 the	 interplay	 between	 political	 actions	 and	 reactions	 both	 ‘from	 below’	 and	 ‘from	
above’,	 and	 which	 situates	 these	 on	 a	 broad	 continuum	 between	 resistance/repression	 and	
collaboration/co-optation.	
Our	argument	draws	on	empirical	material	 from	two	gold	mining	concessions	 in	the	eastern	Congo	
operated	 by	 Banro	 Corporation,	 a	 Canada-based	 transnational	 company.	 Since	 the	 dynamics	 of	
mobilization	 in	 these	 concessions	 display	 important	 similarities,	 we	 have	 generalized	 the	 findings	
emerging	from	the	research	conducted	at	each	site,	rather	than	treating	them	as	comparative	case	
studies.	 Data	 were	 obtained	 through	 extensive	 fieldwork	 conducted	 periodically	 by	 the	 authors	
between	 2008	 and	 2016,	 during	 which	 interviews	 were	 held	 with	 artisanal	 miners,	 farmers,	 local	
authorities,	 security	 services,	 civil	 society	organizations	 and	mostly	Congolese	 company	 staff.	 Field	
data	 were	 complemented	 by	 and	 triangulated	 with	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 documents	 including	 letters,	
petitions,	communications,	and	news	articles	from	Congolese	and	international	media.		
The	 article	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 In	 the	 next	 section	 we	 draw	 on	 relevant	 literature	 on	 social	
mobilization,	specifically	in	relation	to	large-scale	mining,	to	identify	the	debates	to	which	this	article	
aims	 to	 contribute.	 Section	 3	 analyzes	 social	 mobilization	 in	 Banro’s	 concessions,	 focusing	 on	 its	
fluidity	 and	 fragmentation.	 In	 Section	 4,	 we	 provide	 explanations	 for	 the	 observed	 nature	 of	
mobilization,	 exploring	 factors	 which	 are	 both	 internal	 and	 external	 to	 the	 mobilization	 effort.	
Section	5	then	discusses	the	 influence	of	company	practices,	which	paves	the	way	for	a	concluding	




Social	 protest	 against	 large-scale	 mining	 is	 increasingly	 analyzed	 through	 the	 theoretical	 lens	 of	
‘social	mobilization’.	Bebbington	et	al.	(2008:	2890)	understand	such	mobilization	primarily	in	terms	
of	the	defense	of	the	material	and	immaterial	aspects	of	livelihood,	positing	that	it	aims	“to	protect	
assets	 by	 challenging	 the	 structures,	 discourses	 and	 institutions	 that	 drive	 and	permit	 exploitation	






This	 implies	 looking	 not	 only	 at	 different	 types	 of	 protest,	 but	 also	 at	 forms	 of	 acquiescence	 and	
mobilization	around	participation	in	decision-making	and	the	distribution	of	socio-economic	benefits.	
Attention	 to	 diversity	 also	 entails	 exploring	 social	 divisions	 and	 conflicts,	 and	 how	 these	 are	
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worldviews	 and	 mobilizing	 discourses.	 For	 Larmer	 (2010:	 252),	 this	 diversity	 indicates	 how	 these	
movements	 reflect	 “the	 contradictions	 and	 hierarchies	 of	 the	 society	 in	 which	 they	 operate”,	
including	 those	 shaped	 by	 “inequalities	 of	 resources,	 influence	 and	 education	 and	 differences	 of	
class,	 gender	 and	 ethnicity,	 amongst	 others”.	 Similarly	 emphasizing	 divisions	 and	 inequalities,	 de	
Waal	 and	 Ibreck	 (2013:	 309)	 highlight	 how	 these	 features,	 in	 combination	 with	 the	 salience	 of	
informal	 and	 personalized	 politics,	 render	 social	 movements	 susceptible	 to	 co-optation	 and	
transformation	into	“alternative	patronage	systems”.	The	resulting	fragmentation	undermines	these	
movements’	sustainability,	giving	them	an	episodic	character.	According	to	Bebbington	et	al.	(2008),	





the	 mobilization	 of	 financial,	 human,	 organizational,	 and	 informational	 resources	 (McCarthy	 and	
Zald,	 1977;	 2001).	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 resource	 mobilization	 theory	 as	 first	 formulated	 by	
McCarthy	and	Zald	(1977),	sustained	social	mobilization	requires	organizational	structures	capable	of	
harnessing	 financial	 and	 human	 resources.	 It	 is	 therefore	 facilitated	 by	 pre-existing	 forms	 of	
organization.	For	social	movement	theorists	highlighting	political	opportunity	structures	(McAdam	et	
al.,	2001;	Tilly	and	Tarrow,	2007),	the	ability	to	organize	and	attract	resources	 is	also	 influenced	by	
the	 relative	 strength	 of	 a	 movement’s	 domestic	 and	 international	 allies,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
political	order	 in	which	 it	 is	situated,	 including	 its	openness	to	new	political	actors	and	the	 level	of	
repression	(Tilly	and	Tarrow,	2007).		
With	 regard	 to	 extractivist	 projects,	 counter-mobilization	 is	 not	 only	 shaped	 by	 a	 country’s	
authorities,	 but	 also	 by	 company	 reactions.	 However,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 company	 is	 not	 always	
systematically	explored,	as	much	work	focuses	on	mobilization	‘from	below’.	Nevertheless,	a	growing	
body	of	 literature	 studies	 the	 strategies	and	 tactics	 that	 corporations	employ	 to	pre-empt	or	quell	
resistance,	 including	 divide	 and	 rule	 initiatives	 like	 co-optation	 and	 astroturfing,	 public	 relations	
efforts,	 lobby	campaigns,	and	direct	and	indirect	forms	of	repression	and	intimidation	(e.g.	Dunlap,	
2017;	Kraemer	et	 al.,	 2013;	 Lasslett,	 2014).	A	part	of	 this	 literature	explores	how	Corporate	 Social	
Responsibility	 (CSR)	 programs	 are	 harnessed	 within	 efforts	 to	 avoid	 or	 diffuse	 contestation	
(Bebbington	 et	 al.,	 2008;	 Rajak,	 2011),	 including	 by	 enlisting	 local	 elites	 as	 “first	 line	 of	 corporate	
defense”	(Welker,	2009:	143).		
The	 focus	 on	 CSR	 and	 counter-mobilization	 reflects	 growing	 analytical	 attention	 to	 how	 corporate	
policies	shape	company-community	relations,	and	the	ways	in	which	these	policies	are	implemented	
and	experienced	(Haalboom,	2012;	Kirsch,	2014;	Welker,	2014).	This	literature	foregrounds	company	
representatives’	 agency	 when	 implementing	 corporate	 policies,	 and	 how	 these	 representatives	
interpret	 company	 guidelines	 according	 to	 their	 own	 vision.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 study	
company	 practices	 as	 actually	 enacted	 and	 not	 as	 merely	 contained	 in	 formal	 policies.	 These	
practices	 include	acquiescence	and	 inaction,	 for	not	acting	 is	also	a	choice.	 In	this	contribution,	we	









the	 area	 formally	 passed	 from	 rebel	 to	 central	 government	 control	 in	 2003.	 After	 exploration	
activities	had	 started	around	2004-2005	 in	Namoya	 (Maniema	province)	 and	Twangiza	 (South	Kivu	
province),	a	census	of	artisanal	miners	working	and	of	households	(of	mostly	farmers	and	to	a	lesser	
extent	miners)	living	within	the	core	mining	perimeter	was	carried	out	in	2008	(see	Table	1).	A	couple	
of	 years	 later	 these	 miners	 and	 farmers	 and	 their	 families	 were	 forcefully	 displaced.	 In	 each	
concession,	a	Community	Forum	negotiated	a	Memorandum	of	Understanding	 (MoU),	which	were	
signed	 in	 2010	 (Twangiza)	 and	 2014	 (Namoya),	 respectively.	 Twangiza	 Mining	 	 (Banro	 operates	
through	subsidiaries	in	each	concession)	went	into	commercial	production	in	September	2012,	with	
Namoya	Mining	following	suit	in	January	2016.		
Throughout	 the	 different	 stages	 of	 the	 mining	 project,	 from	 exploration	 to	 development	 to	
production,	 Banro’s	 presence	 has	 generated	 various	 cycles	 of	 social	 mobilization.	 As	 further	
explained	 below,	 these	 have	 been	 characterized	 by	 fluidity,	 being	 episodic	 rather	 than	 consistent,	
and	 fragmentation,	 with	 ill-coordinated	 and	 disparate	 groups	 formulating	 different	 and	 changing	
claims,	 expressed	 in	different	discourses.	One	of	 these	groups	 is	 local	 authorities,	which	differ	per	
concession.	The	Twangiza	concession	covers	four	chiefdoms	(Luhwindja,	Burhinyi,	Kaziba,	Ngweshe),	
which	 are	 headed	 by	 a	 paramount	 chief	 (mwami,	 plural:	 bami).	 Chiefdoms	 are	 subdivided	 in	
groupements	 (led	by	a	chef	de	groupement),	which	 in	 turn	consist	of	 localités,	 ruled	by	 lower-level	
chiefs.	 The	 chiefdom	 system	 is	 hierarchically	 and	 centrally	 organized	 with	 strong	 reciprocal	
relationships	between	the	mwami	and	his	‘subjects’	(Geenen	and	Claessens,	2013).	The	organization	
in	Namoya,	by	contrast,	 is	more	decentralized.	The	Namoya	concession	 is	 situated	 in	 the	 sector	of	
Bangubangu	 Salambila	 (BBS),	which	 is	 an	 administrative	 entity	 at	 the	 same	 level	 as	 the	 chiefdom.	
However,	 it	 is	 led	by	a	state-appointed	chef	de	secteur	(sector	chief)	rather	than	a	customary	chief,	























In	 both	 concessions,	 the	 first	 instances	 of	 widespread	 social	 mobilization	 occurred	 around	 the	
announcement	 and	 execution	 of	 involuntary	 resettlement	 plans:	 in	 Luhwindja	 chiefdom	 in	 the	
Twangiza	 concession,	 an	 estimated	 6,000	 miners	 and	 850	 households	 were	 to	 be	 displaced	 from	
Mbwega	hill;	in	Namoya	a	roughly	equal	number	of	miners	and	195	households	were	to	be	relocated	







Banro	 initially	 responded	with	 repression,	putting	 so-called	 ‘troublemakers’	on	a	black	 list.	 Yet	 the	
company	 came	 under	 severe	 pressure	 to	 improve	 relations	with	 the	 community	 and	 preserve	 the	
‘social	 peace’.	 In	 2009	 they	 decided	 to	 set	 up	 a	 Community	 Forum,	 in	 which	 representatives	 of	
different	 socio-economic	 groups	 were	 to	 negotiate	 with	 the	 company	 over	 resettlement,	
compensation,	employment	and	community	development.	The	composition	of	the	Forum,	however,	
was	heavily	disputed.	 For	example,	 the	president	of	 the	participating	miners’	 committee	was	 soon	








surprise	 that	 contentious	 action	 against	 the	 company	 has	 taken	 the	 form	 of	 a	 ‘re-possession’	 of	
artisanal	mining	sites.	
In	 Namoya,	 the	 resettlement	 process	 unfolded	 in	 a	 slightly	 different	 way.	 Banro	 seems	 to	 have	
learned	lessons	from	Twangiza,	where	miners	had	re-occupied	a	part	of	the	concession	and	attempts	
to	 train	 artisanal	 miners	 for	 alternative	 activities	 had	 largely	 failed	 (partly	 because	 of	 corruption	
among	local	organizations,	see	Geenen,	2015).	In	Namoya,	Banro	negotiated	with	the	government	to	
create	 an	 artisanal	 mining	 zone	 in	 Matete,	 about	 25km	 from	 Mwendamboko.	 The	 plan	 was	 to	














offices.	According	 to	a	news	 report	 (Radio	Okapi,	2012),	an	 intervention	by	 the	national	police	 left	
three	miners	wounded,	which	 a	 company	 statement	 denied.7	 Later,	 the	 group	went	 to	 Kimbaseke	
village,	where	they	targeted	the	homes	of	company	staff,8	of	certain	community	leaders	considered	







In	 2012	 a	 cahier	 de	 charges12	 listing	 community	 expectations	 vis-à-vis	 Banro	 in	 terms	 of	 social	
benefits	 was	 handed	 over	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 Bangubangu	 Salamabila	 (BBS)	 sector.	 Two	 years	 of	
negotiations	 followed,	 culminating	 in	 the	 signing	 of	 a	MoU	 determining	 and	 prioritizing	 company	
interventions.13	 This	MoU	 has	 generated	 high	 expectations,	which	 by	 the	 time	 of	 our	 fieldwork	 in	
September	 2015	 had	 turned	 into	 disappointment	 and	 frustration.	 These	 feelings	 eventually	
prompted	collective	mobilization	by	 local	customary	 leaders	and	civil	society,	 leading	to	a	new	and	
more	 broad-based	 march	 protesting	 the	 ‘non-respect	 of	 the	 cahier	 de	 charges’	 in	 January	 2016.	




to	mine.14	 Company	 representatives	 have	 cast	 doubt	 on	 this	 account,	 claiming	 that	 the	protestors	
first	displayed	violent	intentions	before	the	policeman	opened	fire.15	
From	 the	 timeline	 presented	 above,	 we	 can	 deduct	 that	 direct	 protest	 (demonstrations,	 re-
occupations,	 property	 destruction)	 peaked	 at	 specific	 moments,	 notably	 the	 announcement	 and	

























artisanal	 miners	 joined	 forces	 with	 farmers,	 civil	 society	 and	 local	 authorities.	 In	 between	 these	
junctures	 of	 concerted	 action,	 various	 other	 forms	 of	 more	 fragmented	 contentious	 action	 took	
place,	 such	 as	 discussions	 in	 the	 Community	 Forum,	 the	 writing	 of	 letters	 and	 petitions,	 and	 the	
lobbying	 of	 national	 politicians.	 These	 activities	 were	 generally	 undertaken	 by	 individual	 interest	
groups	 represented	 in	 the	 Forum,	 many	 of	 which	 had	 not	 collaborated	 or	 constituted	 separate	
organizations	before.	As	described	 for	 the	artisanal	miners,	 some	of	 these	groups	 faced	challenges	
concerning	representation,	with	the	leadership	seen	as	failing	to	represent	the	interests	of	the	base.	
Moreover,	many	were	 internally	 divided,	 as	members	 held	 different	 attitudes	 vis-à-vis	 the	mining	
project,	 which	 also	 hampered	 collaboration	 between	 groups.	 Paradoxically,	 certain	 groups,	 like	
artisanal	miners	 and	 farmers,	 simultaneously	or	 alternately	 totally	 rejected	 the	mining	project	 and	
demanded	more	 inclusion,	 in	the	sense	of	sharing	 in	decision-making	and	potential	benefits.	These	
demands	 were	 formulated	 in	 different	 discourses,	 reflecting	 various	 worldviews	 and	 logics.	While	
some	 groups	 employed	 rights-based	 discourses	 –a	 frequent	 observation	 among	miners	 was	 “they	
just	 have	 to	 give	 us	 what	 we	 are	 entitled	 to”16–	 others	 drew	 upon	 discourses	 of	 belonging,	
highlighting	 their	 ancestral	 connection	with	 the	 land.	 In	 the	words	 of	 one	 trader:	 “They	 shouldn’t	
quickly	plunder	the	riches	that	our	ancestors	have	left	for	us	in	the	subsoil.”17	
This	 invocation	 of	 discourses	 of	 belonging	 connected	 the	 mobilization	 effort	 to	 pre-existing	
(sometimes	 latent)	 conflicts	 between	 identity	 groups	 and	 administrative	 entities,	 which	 were	
activated	or	 aggravated	by	 the	 company’s	 presence.	 This	 dynamic	was	 strongly	 visible	 in	Namoya,	
where	 different	 groups	 started	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 concession	 was	 located	 on	 their	 land,	 the	





level,	 there	 are	 disputes	 between	 different	 ethnic	 groups,	 with	 the	 Bangubangu	 considering	
themselves	 as	 ‘autochthones’	 (which	 is	 contested	 by	 a	 minority	 group	 named	 the	 Hongwa19),	 as	
opposed	 to	 Bashi	 migrants	 and	 Barega	 (coming	 from	 South	 Kivu).	 In	 addition,	 there	 are	 conflicts	
between	BBS	 and	 other	 sectors	 in	Maniema	 province.20	 As	 a	 participant	 in	 the	 Community	 Forum	
explained:		
It	was	a	discussion	point	at	the	Forum:	who	is	the	‘affected	community’.	Some	members	said	
it	 was	 the	 entire	 Kabambare	 territory.	 Others	 said	 no.	 (…)	 Even	 people	 from	 neighboring	
territories	 came	and	made	 similar	 claims.	But	we	 stuck	 to	 the	 administrative	divisions	 and	
decided	to	go	with	the	sector	of	BBS.	But	even	now	people	are	still	making	these	claims,	and	
chiefs	come	with	their	own	cahier	de	charges.21		
In	 sum,	 the	 social	 mobilization	 effort	 was	 hampered	 by	 conflicts	 both	 between	 and	 within	 the	



















The	 existence	 of	 seemingly	 contradictory	 and	 often	 changing	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 company	 (for	
instance	rejecting	 its	presence,	but	simultaneously	or	alternately	demanding	a	greater	share	of	the	









between	 different	 patronage	 networks	 (Trefon,	 2011).	 While	 such	 networks	 can	 provide	 an	
organizational	 framework	 for	 mobilization,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 protests	 against	 industrial	 mining,	 they	
often	 end	 up	 undermining	 the	 coherence	 of	mobilization	 efforts,	 as	 they	 cut	 across	 the	 different	
professional	and	other	 interest	groups	 involved.	Additionally,	patronage	politics	 fosters	a	penchant	
for	 co-optation,	 implying	 the	 granting	 of	 access	 to	 favors	 in	 exchange	 for	 loyalty,	 which	 leads	 to	
unstable	positions	among	local	leaders	(Verweijen,	2015;	2016).		





people	 to	 anticipate	 disproportionate	 and	 arbitrary	 repression	 (Verweijen,	 2015).	 Heavy-handed	
interventions	also	contribute	to	the	fluidity	of	social	mobilization,	as	they	make	people	quickly	refrain	
from	further	action	out	of	fear.			
This	 broader	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 context	 shapes	 the	 coherence	 and	 sustainability	 of	
contentious	 action	 and	 the	 involved	 groups’	 capabilities	 for	 mobilizing	 resources.	 In	 Namoya	 and	
Twangiza,	none	of	these	groups	has	substantial	financial	resources,	 impairing	their	activities.	This	is	
particularly	the	case	for	the	committees	of	artisanal	miners,	which	moreover	lack	bargaining	power.	
Collective	 action	 by	 artisanal	miners	 has	 been	 further	 undermined	 by	 this	 group’s	 diversity.	While	
some	miners	are	from	the	concession	area	and	prefer	to	stay	there,	others	come	from	afar	and	are	
relatively	mobile,	 periodically	 changing	mining	 sites	 or	 jobs.	 Additionally,	 when	 resettlement	 took	
place,	 the	miners	became	dispersed	and	divided.	For	example,	after	 the	closure	of	Mwendamboko	
hill	 in	Namoya,	 some	moved	 to	artisanal	mining	 sites	 further	away,	 like	Misisi	 in	South	Kivu,	while	
others	 continued	 to	 dig	 in	 or	 around	Banro’s	 concessions,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 caught.	 Yet	
other	miners	left	the	mining	sector	altogether,	trying	to	earn	an	income	in	a	different	way.	A	fourth,	
relatively	small	group,	joined	the	mining	and	agricultural	cooperatives	created	with	the	assistance	of	
Banro	 to	 help	 convert	 the	 miners	 to	 alternative	 livelihoods.	 While	 the	 mining	 cooperative	 has	
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received	 (limited)	material	 support,	 they	 are	 struggling	 to	 access	 gold,	which	 is	much	 scarcer	 and	
deeper	 underground	 than	 where	 they	 used	 to	 dig.	 In	 addition	 to	 frustrations	 about	 Banro’s	
unfulfilled	 promises,	 cooperative	 members	 also	 feel	 the	 contempt	 of	 non-members:	 “We	 are	
supposed	to	be	examples	for	the	rest	of	the	community.	The	company	should	embrace	us.	But	today	
we,	as	well	as	those	who	disagreed	with	us,	we	are	all	in	the	same	situation.	They	begin	to	make	fun	
of	 us”.22	 Finally,	 as	 in	 Twangiza,	 the	 unity	 of	 miners	 in	 Namoya	 has	 been	 undermined	 by	
disagreements	 over	 representation,	 which	 were	 aggravated	 by	 company	 efforts	 to	 co-opt	 their	
leaders,	as	further	discussed	below.		
The	issues	of	contested	leadership	and	limited	resources	have	also	hampered	the	mobilizing	capacity	
of	 civil	 society	 organizations	 in	Namoya,	which	 are	 united	 in	 a	 platform	with	 an	 elected	 president	
that	 is	 simply	 known	 as	 société	 civile	 (civil	 society).	 Another	 factor	 affecting	 these	 organizations’	
mobilizing	 capacity	 is	 their	 relative	 isolation.	Namoya	 is	weakly	 connected	 to	 the	provincial	 power	
centers	of	Kindu	(Maniema)	and	–despite	the	recent	rehabilitation	of	the	road	towards	Uvira–Bukavu	
(South	Kivu).	Internet	has	only	recently	become	accessible,	with	the	rise	of	cell	phone	network-based	
access.	 In	 combination	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 highly	 educated	members,	 this	 isolation	 partly	 explains	 the	
absence	 of	 NGOs	 with	 international	 funding	 and	 good	 connections	 with	 (trans)national	 advocacy	
networks.	 Twangiza,	 by	 contrast,	 is	 only	 a	 two	 hours’	 drive	 from	 Bukavu.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	
location	 enhances	 opportunities	 for	 social	 mobilization,	 providing	 access	 to	 political,	 human	 and	
financial	 resources.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	 intensifies	 local	 associations’	 connection	 to	 the	 interests	
and	 conflicts	 of	 urban-based	 elites.	 In	 the	 following	 section,	 we	 show	 how	 the	 availability	 of	
resources	and	 influential	allies	did	not	enable	stronger	coordination	 in	Twangiza,	but	 rendered	 the	
mobilization	effort	subject	to	diverging	elite	agendas	(cf.	Verweijen,	2017).		
As	with	civil	society	organizations,	local	authorities	and	other	elites	have	displayed	limited	coherence	
in	 their	mobilization	 efforts,	 reflecting	 their	 heterogeneity	 and	 the	 changing	 dynamics	 of	 alliance-
making.	 In	 Twangiza,	 Banro	 decided	 to	 closely	 collaborate	 with	 the	 chiefs,	 in	 particular	 the	
mwamikazi	of	Luhwindja.	When	they	asked	her	to	facilitate	the	company’s	installation	in	2005,	they	
actually	 played	 into	 an	 ongoing	 succession	 conflict	 between	 and	 within	 two	 rivaling	 families,	
reinforcing	 the	 mwamikazi’s	 position	 while	 sidelining	 her	 competitors	 (Geenen,	 2015).	 The	
mwamikazi	 subsequently	 gained	 additional	 political	 clout	 (by	 being	 co-opted	 into	 the	 provincial	
parliament	 after	 the	2006	elections)	 and	economic	power	 (by	winning	 contracts	 from	Banro).	 This	
further	sparked	opposition	against	her	and	gave	this	opposition	an	 increasingly	political	and	supra-
local	dimension.	An	important	catalyst	of	these	developments	was	Codelu,	a	group	of	Bukavu-based	
elites	 from	 Luhwindja	 that	 was	 initially	 supportive	 of	 the	 Banro/mwamikazi	 alliance,	 not	 least	




abdication.23	 In	 the	aftermath,	 two	 leaders	of	 the	organization	 that	had	 initiated	 the	petition	were	
arrested.	 These	 events	 prompted	 Codelu	 to	 openly	 accuse	 the	mwamikazi	 of	 bad	management,24	
																																								 																				
22	Interview	member	of	cooperative,	10.09.2015.		
23	 Pétition	 de	 la	 population	 de	 Luhwindja	 contre	Madame	 Espérance	M’Baharanyi	 La	 Namunene,	 2012.	The	





while	 another	 group	 of	 Bukavu-based	 elites	 from	 Luhwindja	 started	 blaming	 Codelu	 in	 turn.25	 At	
about	the	same	time,	a	family	that	has	been	a	rival	to	the	Luhwindja	throne	for	decades	began	to	tap	
into	 these	 existing	 divisions	 to	 reinforce	 its	 position.26	 In	 2015	 they	were	 accused	 of	 organizing	 a	
violent	attack	on	the	residence	of	the	mwami,	who	by	then	had	formally	taken	over	power.27	After	







In	 Namoya,	 where	 there	 are	 only	 lower-level	 (groupement)	 chiefs	 who	 lack	 direct	 political	
connections	 in	Kinshasa,	Banro	chose	to	collaborate	primarily	with	the	chief	of	the	BBS	sector.	The	





nothing	 but	 lie	 to	 me.	 They	 tell	 me	 to	 wait	 for	 my	 contribution	 until	 they’ll	 be	 in	 the	
production	phase.	But	they	are	producing!	They	think	I	am	a	‘little	man’.	But	this	is	my	land	!	




their	 income	 and	 power,	 the	 bami	 have	 tried	 to	 redress	 the	 situation	 by	 making	 demands	 for	
inclusion	(they	presented,	for	example,	their	own	cahier	de	charges	and	created	labor	hire	or	service	
companies	 to	be	 contracted	by	Banro)	 and	by	 seizing	upon	existing	 social	mobilization	against	 the	
company.	Thus,	they	started	to	voice	the	same	grievances	as	the	population,	thereby	reinforcing	the	
idea	of	being	their	 ‘real	 representatives’.	At	 the	same	time,	 they	accused	competing	 local	elites,	 in	




To	 conclude,	 the	 different	 groups	 involved	 in	 social	mobilization	 around	 Banro	 often	 have	 limited	
pre-existing	organizational	structures;	lack	adequate	financial	and	human	resources;	are	embroiled	in	
internal	conflicts;	and	are	at	times	dominated	by	elites	involved	in	local	power	struggles	who	display	
inconsistent	 attitudes.	 Reflecting	 their	 evolving	 relations	 with	 the	 company,	 local	 elites	 tend	 to	



















of	 the	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 context,	 or	 the	 features	 of	 the	 mobilizing	 groups.	 Certain	
company	 practices	 intensify	 the	 factors	 that	 undermine	 the	 coherence	 and	 sustainability	 of	 social	
mobilization,	for	instance	by	promoting	rapidly	changing	attitudes	towards	the	company	or	a	climate	
of	fear.	In	this	section	we	analyze	four	such	practices:	the	co-optation	of	local	leaders	and	dissenters;	
acquiescence	 of	 favoritism	 related	 to	 access	 to	 benefits;	 fostering	 a	 climate	 of	 repression;	 and	
rhetorical	rather	than	real	commitment	towards	community	participation.		
Reflecting	local	political	logics,	Banro	generally	engages	in	co-optation.	A	staff	member	of	its	Human	
Resources	 department	 explained	 for	 instance	 that	 service	 and	 labor	 hire	 contracts	 are	 preferably	
granted	 to	 local	 elites,	 not	 because	 they	 offer	 the	 highest	 quality	 services,	 but	 to	 keep	 them	
satisfied.31	Additionally,	in	its	concessions,	the	company	tends	to	rely	on	a	few	local	authorities	who	
are	 loyal	 to	 them	 and	 act	 as	 intermediaries	 towards	 the	 community.	 It	 counts	 on	 these	
intermediaries	to	enforce	decisions,	manage	dissent	and	handle	competing	authorities.	By	becoming	
privileged	 channels	 of	 influence	 and	 resources,	 these	 co-opted	 authorities	 often	 see	 their	 power	







favor	 their	 own	 network,	 particularly	 when	 it	 pertains	 to	 access	 to	 jobs.	 	 According	 to	 the	 MoU	
signed	 in	Namoya:	“The	company	as	well	as	 its	subcontractors	give	priority	to	 local	manpower	and	
will	do	its	best	to	distribute	jobs	fairly	among	the	different	towns	and	villages”.33	Fair	distribution	was	
to	 be	 achieved	 through	 setting	 up	 a	 sub-committee	 within	 the	 Community	 Forum	 that	 had	 to	





the	 list”35	and	 that	you	need	to	be	“close	 to	 the	sector	chief”	 in	order	 to	get	a	 job.36	Despite	 their	






















instance,	 the	 person	 designated	 to	 be	 the	 representative	 of	 the	 artisanal	miners	 in	 Namoya,	who	
initially	strongly	resisted	the	closure	of	the	mining	sites,	was	offered	the	post	of	president	of	the	new	
miners’	 cooperative	 created	 with	 Banro’s	 help.	 This	 representative	 has	 since	 become	 heavily	




representative	 even	 created	 a	 service	 company	 for	 cutting	 and	 processing	 wood	 in	 the	 Namoya	
concession	and	signed	a	contract	with	Banro,	reflecting	his	privileged	position.41	
Co-optation	typically	 interacts	with	coercion.	While	our	findings	do	not	 indicate	that	the	repression	
of	 contentious	 action	 is	 company	 policy,	 we	 do	 conclude	 that	 Banro’s	 practices	 contribute	 to	
fostering	 a	 climate	 in	 which	 repression	 is	 a	 regular	 occurrence.	 The	 company	 takes	 for	 instance	
limited	initiatives	to	prevent	or	follow	up	on	incidents	by	the	Congolese	police	staff	that	it	contracts,	
like	pressing	for	changing	abusive	units.	To	secure	its	installations,	Banro	contracts	units	of	the	PNC	
(Congolese	 police)	 and	 private	 security	 contractors	 (at	 present	 G4S)	 (Hönke,	 2014).	 While	 these	
contractors	 are	 charged	 with	 conducting	 human	 rights	 training	 to	 ensure	 the	 correct	 behavior	 of	
Congolese	 security	 staff,	 the	 training	 is	 reported	 to	 be	 of	 low	 quality.	 As	 a	 former	 employee	 of	 a	
private	security	contractor	explained:	
Banro	 does	 not	 organize	 much	 training	 in	 human	 rights	 for	 the	 GMI	 [Groupe	 Mobile	
d’Intervention,	 the	 police	 unit	 that	 attaches	 its	 staff	 to	 Banro].	 Previously,	 there	 was	


















has	become	an	 important	 source	of	 income	 for	 security	 staff.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	practices	
undermine	 the	 credibility	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 this	 staff,	 there	 appear	 to	 be	 limited	 efforts	 from	 the	
company	to	prevent	or	sanction	them.	
The	 company	 has	 also	 been	 criticized	 for	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 has	 handled	 the	 violent	 events	 in	
Namoya	 in	 January	 2016,	 when	 a	 captain	 of	 the	 GMI	 unit	 contracted	 by	 Banro	 opened	 fire	 on	 a	
crowd	 of	 protestors,	 leading	 to	 the	 death	 of	 a	 human	 rights	 activist.	 While	 Banro	 deferred	 all	
responsibility,	saying	they	did	not	give	the	orders,45	a	ruling	of	the	Tribunal	Militaire	de	Garnison	(a	
military	court,	which	in	the	Congo	has	jurisdiction	over	police	personnel)	assigned	the	company	civil	
responsibility	 and	 imposed	 hefty	 reparations	 to	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 victim’s	 family.	 However,	 as	 the	
company	 is	 waiting	 for	 the	 appeal	 to	 this	 ruling	 introduced	 at	 the	 military	 court	 in	 Kindu,	 the	
impression	emerged	that	it	is	not	doing	anything	to	help	this	family.	The	company	also	threatened	to	
sue	 those	 who	 organized	 the	 January	 march,	 namely,	 the	 civil	 society	 president,	 the	 customary	






the	GMI	unit,	alleging	 that	 the	demonstrators	were	violent.	 In	 the	words	of	a	community	 relations	
person:	 “They	organized	 a	 so-called	 sit-in	 but	with	machetes	 and	whips;	 that	 is	 not	 a	 sit-in.	 These	
policemen	 are	 not	 foolish,	 he	 [captain]	 has	 engaged	 in	 legitimate	 self-defense”.48	 This	 same	
representative	 commented	 that	 the	 people	 in	 Namoya	were	 ‘disagreeable’	 [antipathiques],	 which	
provides	some	 insight	 into	why	 limited	action	has	been	undertaken	to	mend	relations	and	prevent	
security	staff	continuing	to	engage	in	violent	actions.	
That	 Banro’s	 reaction	 to	 the	 January	 events	was	 counterproductive	 is	 proven	 by	 escalation	 in	 the	
following	months,	as	armed	bands	started	to	attack	company	property.	In	September	2016,	six	trucks	
were	 burned	 close	 to	 Namoya	 in	 an	 attack	 on	 a	 convoy	 transporting	 fuel	 and	mining	 equipment	
(Wilson,	 2016).	 On	 31	 December	 2016,	 a	 similar	 attack	 targeted	 two	 vehicles	 of	 Banro’s	
subcontractor	CIVICON	(Radio	Okapi,	2017).	 In	March	2017,	 five	workers	were	kidnapped	(Reuters,	
2017)	and	in	May	that	year	“a	series	of	attacks	on	police	and	military	personnel	in	the	village	areas	


















Yet	 these	words	 should	not	 be	 read	 as	 an	 endorsement	 of	 the	 recent	 violent	 actions,	which	were	
carried	 out	 by	 armed	 groups,	 and	 not	 by	 community	members.	 In	 fact,	 the	 involvement	 of	 these	
groups	 has	 created	 further	 divisions:	while	 some	 sympathize	with	 them,	 albeit	 in	 varying	 degrees,	
many	do	not	support	their	actions	(Verweijen,	2017).	
A	 final	 way	 in	 which	 Banro	 practices	 negatively	 affect	 the	 coherence	 and	 sustainability	 of	 social	
mobilization	 is	 by	 the	 company’s	 approach	 to	 community	 participation.	 While	 Banro	 formally	





Forum	 participants.	 Furthermore,	 we	 have	 documented	 a	 case	 in	 which	 a	 decision	 made	 by	 the	
Forum	was	 ‘overruled’	 by	 a	 staff	member	 of	 the	 Banro	 Foundation,	 the	 company’s	 ‘development’	
arm,	because	the	 latter	believed	he	knew	what	was	‘best’	 for	the	community.	While	the	MoU	with	
the	BBS	sector	identified	building	a	technical	school	as	a	priority	intervention,	the	staff	member	told	
he	was	dissuading	 this	 initiative	because	 (he	believed)	 it	would	not	work	and	was	 too	expensive.52	
Whereas	this	attitude	might	be	informed	by	previous	experiences	with	development	interventions,	it	
also	indicates	a	paternalist	reflex	that	combines	oddly	with	the	emphasis	on	community	participation	
and	 empowerment.	 This	 penchant	 for	 paternalism	 is	 further	 corroborated	 by	 this	 staff	 member’s	
views	on	the	local	population	in	a	village	where	the	Banro	Foundation’s	development	initiatives	were	
not	well	received	by	the	inhabitants.53	As	he	commented:	“But	they	are	lazy	[ce	sont	des	paresseux],	I	
do	not	give	anything	 for	nothing,	 you	have	 to	work	 for	 it	 (..)	 they	do	not	understand,	 they	do	not	
want	 to	work.”54	Fostering	community	participation	 is	apparently	also	hindered	by	company	staff’s	
perceptions	 of	 local	 associations	 as	 only	 pursuing	 self-interest.	 As	 a	 former	 community	 relations	
officer	commented	on	Namoya:	“There	is	no	credible	local	association	there.	We	never	worked	with	
any	community-based	organization	as	they	were	all	created	ad	hoc.”55	
While	 token	 commitment	 to	 participation	 would	 seem	 to	 provoke	 generalized	 discontent	 and	
therefore	 strengthen	 the	 coherence	 of	 social	 mobilization,	 in	 practice,	 it	 tends	 to	 foster	 further	
fragmentation,	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 in	 their	 desire	 to	 be	 included	 in	 the	 eventual	 benefits,	 the	
‘loyalists’	tend	to	adopt	the	point	of	view	proposed	by	company	representatives,	while	others	stick	to	
their	 original	 position	 or	 criticize	 the	 company	 for	 not	 living	 up	 to	 its	 promises.	 Second,	 if	
interventions	proposed	by	the	Community	Forum	never	materialize,	the	legitimacy	of	this	Forum	and	
hence	 the	 desirability	 of	 allying	 with	 them	may	 be	 questioned	 both	 by	 the	 base	 of	 the	 different	
interest	groups	represented,	who	often	already	heavily	distrust	their	leaders,	and	by	the	population	













an	 already	 fractured	 context	 where	 economic	 opportunities	 are	 scarce,	 we	 believe	 that	 company	
management	and	other	staff	do	have	choices.	They	could	for	instance	act	in	a	more	conflict-sensitive	
manner	(e.g.	by	not	taking	obvious	sides	in	an	ongoing	authority	dispute,	or	by	not	threatening	to	sue	
community	 leaders)	 and	 take	 up	 lessons	 learned.	 For	 instance,	 the	 counterproductive	 effects	 of	
repression	 in	Twangiza	did	not	 lead	 to	efforts	 to	avoid	 such	a	 scenario	 in	Namoya.	 In	our	analysis,	
these	actions	and	inactions	bespeak	particular	logics	and	beliefs	–	including	regarding	the	nature	of	
the	population	and	what	 interventions	are	appropriate	and	desirable–	that	are	specific	 to	 the	staff	





social	mobilization	 provoked	 by	 industrial	mining	 projects	 in	 the	 eastern	 Congo.	 This	mobilization	
was	 observed	 to	 be	 both	 fluid,	 being	 inconsistent	 and	 unstable,	 and	 fragmented,	 due	 to	 limited	
coordination	 between	 different	 groups	 and	 leaderships,	 and	 the	 articulation	 of	 varying	 demands,	
ranging	 from	 rejection	 to	 inclusion.	 Moreover,	 across	 as	 well	 as	 within	 these	 groups,	 attitudes	
towards	the	company	are	informed	by	diverse,	sometimes	seemingly	contradictory,	discourses.		
We	 have	 ascribed	 this	 fragmentation	 and	 fluidity	 to	 three	 factors:	 first,	 those	 internal	 to	 the	
mobilization	effort,	 second,	 the	socio-economic	and	political	 context	and	 third,	 company	practices.	
Drawing	upon	elements	of	resource	mobilization	and	political	opportunity	structure	theory,	we	have	
highlighted	 how	 sustained	 and	 coherent	 mobilization	 is	 undermined	 by	 mobilizing	 groups’	 weak	
organizational	 structures	 and	 limited	 resources;	 and	 a	 context	 marked	 by	 scarce	 livelihood	
possibilities,	 intra-community	 divisions,	 patronage-based	 politics,	 and	 repression.	 However,	 the	
fluidity	 and	 fragmentation	 of	 mobilization	 also	 result	 from	 company	 practices,	 like	 co-optation,	
acquiescence	of	favoritism,	limited	supervision	of	security	personnel,	and	ambiguous	commitment	to	
community	 participation.	 In	 our	 reading,	 the	 literature	 on	 social	 mobilization	 against	 and	 around	





acquiescence,	 in	 addition	 to	 their	 actions,	 or	 glosses	 over	 the	 contradictory	 effects	 of	 corporate	
practices.	For	 instance,	while	CSR	efforts	may	in	some	contexts	defuse	tensions	(e.g.	Bebbington	et	
al.,	 2008),	 in	our	 case,	 they	 stimulated	 conflicts	 and	 fostered	antipathies	 towards	 the	 company	by	
creating	disillusionment.	Our	analysis	thus	calls	for	a	more	interactionist	approach	to	analyzing	social	
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